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COMMENT
GROUP TERM LIFE INSURANCE:
CURRENT ESTATE TAX PROBLEMS
UNDER INTERNAL REVENUE CODE
SECTION 2035
The estate tax treatment of group term life insurance pro-
ceeds under section 20351 (dealing with transfers deemed
made within three years of death) remains surprisingly murky
despite the widespread adoption of such policies.2 Even recent
developments have merely substituted new uncertainty for
old.
Three factors demand that estate planners better under-
stand group term life insurance:
The continuing rapid growth of group insurance purchases
by (a) employers providing an employee fringe benefit and
(b) professional and trade groups providing a membership
benefit option;3
The high rate of asset inflation that has continued since
estate tax rates and exemptions were overhauled by the Tax
Reform Act of 1976;4
1. Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended by the Internal Revenue Act of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600 (1978) [hereinafter I.R.C.].
2. The Life Insurance Fact Book, states that 43% of all life insurance in force in
the United States at the end of 1977 was issued on a group basis, and that term
policies, including individual term policies and the term insurance portion of combi-
nation plans, accounted for 33.3% of all ordinary insurance in that same year. AMERI-
CAN COUNCIL OF LIFE INSURANCE, LIFE INSURANCE FACT BOOK 27-29 (1978).
3. The amount of group life insurance in force at the end of 1977 was triple the
amount in force at the end of 1967. At the end of 1973, 89.3% of the group life
insurance master policies covered employer-employee groups, accounting for 86.1% of
the total value of group life insurance in force. Other groups indirectly related to
employment or occupation accounted for 0.6% of the group master policies and 4.8%
of the total group coverage amount. Id. at 29-30.
4. Congressional committee reports discussing the 1976 Act noted that the
purchasing power of the dollar had, by that time, decreased to less than one-third of
its value in 1942, the year that the $60,000 exemption (to be replaced by the unified
credit) was enacted. H.R. REP. No. 94-1380, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 15-16 (1976); S. REP.
No. 94-1236, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 607-08 (1976).
Business Week cites a recent Salomon Bros. study showing the compound annual
rate of inflation in various asset values since 1968: stocks 3.1%, gold 19.4%, diamonds
11.8%, single-family housing 9.6%, Money & Banking - The Death of Equities,
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The proliferation of new policy combinations and
permutations.5
So while the Tax Reform Act of 19766 raised the minimum
value of estates subject to tax, the inflation of asset values
will subject an increasing number of estates to taxation - and
Bus. WEEK, Aug. 13, 1979, at 54. The study also noted a compound annual rate of
increase in the Consumer Price Index of 6.5% over the same period. Id. In recent
months the Bureau of Labor Statistics has frequently reported annually-adjusted
Consumer Price Index increases in excess of 10%. See monthly paperback volumes or
loose-leaf service, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, CONSUMER PRICE
INDEX (1979). Although the Consumer Price Index does not measure asset inflation, it
does provide an indication of the current rate of inflation in general.
5. See Vogel, Contracts for Special Needs, in LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE HAND-
BOOK 92 (D. Gregg & V. Lucas ed. 1973).
6. Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (1976).
7. The unified credit will permit transfer free of estate taxation for the following
combined gift and estate tax amounts (listed by year of decedent's death): 1977,
$120,667; 1978, $134,000; 1979, $147,333; 1980, $161,563; 1981 (and after), $175,625.
See I.R.C. §§ 2010(a) & (b), 2505(a) & (b), and 2001(b) & (c). See also H.R. REP. No.
94-1380, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 15-16 (1976); S. REP. No. 94-1236, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
607-08 (1976). In addition, the estate tax marital deduction now generally permits
deduction of bequests to a spouse not exceeding the greater of $250,000 or 50% of the
value of the gross estate, thus allowing an estate as large as $425,625 to pass to a
spouse free of estate tax.
Prior to the 1976 amendments, the estate tax exemption (now replaced by the
unified credit) was $60,000. I.R.C. § 2052 (repealed 1976). Thus the maximum
amount that could be transferred (in a noncharitable transfer) free of estate tax to a
nonspouse by a decedent dying before 1977 was $60,000, compared to $175,625 after
1980.
Similarly, the pre-1977 Code limited the marital deduction to one-half the gross
estate, even for estates of less than $250,000. I.R.C. § 2056(c)(1)(amended 1976 &
1978). If the entire estate were given to the spouse, the maximum tax-free estate
would be $120,000 for decedents dying before 1977 and, as noted, $425,625 for dece-
dents dying after 1976 (with some exceptions listed in Pub. L. No. 94-455, I.R.C. §
2001(d)(1)). Although this amount seems adequate for reasonable family needs, it
should be noted that it took Congress thirty-four years to revise the $60,000 exemp-
tion and twenty-eight years to increase the marital deduction for estates of $250,000
or less, a sufficient period to permit the dollar to lose two-thirds of its purchasing
power. See reports cited note 4 supra.
The Wisconsin inheritance tax is a tax levied on that which is received rather than
on the estate itself. See Wis. STAT. § 72.11 (1977). Accordingly, exemptions are avail-
able to individual distributees in specific classes rather than to the estate itself. Wis.
STAT. § 72.17 (1977). The spousal exemption has now been increased to $250,000.
1979 Wis. Laws ch. 1, § 47 (amending Wis. STAT. § 72.17). In addition, the inheritance
tax rate varies according to the relationship of the distributee to the decedent. Wis.
STAT. § 72.18 (1977). The marginal tax rate of a spouse receiving taxable property is
half the marginal rate applicable to the equivalent amount received by the decedent's
children or parents. Compare Wis. STAT. § 72.18(1) (1977) with Wis. STAT. §
72.16(1)(1977).
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increasing numbers of those estates are likely to include group
term life insurance.8
Because an employee is permitted to exclude from gross
income each year the employer-paid premiums for the first
$50,000 worth of group term life insurance coverage, 9 this has
8. See notes 2 & 3 supra.
9. I.R.C. § 79(a)(1). In contrast, employer premium payments for permanent in-
surance benefits (such as ordinary level premium or single-pay whole-life policies)
must be included in the employee's gross income in the year of payment. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.61-2(d)(2)(ii) and Treas. Reg. § 1.79-1(f), T.D. 7623, 1979-26 I.R.B. 7 (for policies
not meeting the requirements of I.R.C. § 79); Treas. Reg. § 1.79-1(d)(1), T.D. 7623,
1979-26 I.R.B. 7 (for permanent benefits combined with term insurance which meets
the requirements of I.R.C. § 79).
Premium payments for group term insurance coverage in excess of the amount of
group coverage allowable under state law must also be included in the employee's
gross income. Treas. Reg. § 1.79-1(e), T.D. 7623, 1979-2 I.R.B. 7. Wisconsin limits
group insurance coverage to $100,000 on any one insured life. Wis. STAT. § 632.55
(1977). Because Wisconsin does not limit wholesale insurance coverage (groups of in-
dividual policies purchased by an employer) and these policies are specifically in-
cluded in the definition of "group policy" contained in Treasury Regulation § 1.79-0,
T.D. 7623, 1979-26 I.R.B. 7, it would appear that larger amounts of coverage of Wis-
consin residents under wholesale term life policies would be eligible for favorable sec-
tion 79 income tax treatment of the portion includible in the employee's gross in-
come. See note 11 and accompanying text infra.
It would also appear that coverage of a self-employed person such as a partner or
sole proprietor would not be exempted from income tax under section 79 because
such a person would fall outside the definition of "employee." This would be the case
even though that coverage is under a plan also covering that person's employees. See
Treas. Reg. § 1.79-0, T.D. 7623, 1979-26 I.R.B. 7.
Accidental death policy premiums will not be sheltered by section 79 because the
Treasury takes a position that to constitute group term life policies, the policies must
pay a general death benefit. Treas. Reg. § 1.79-1(a)(1) & (f)(3), T.D. 7623, 1979-26
I.R.B. 7. However, the premiums may be excludible from the employee's gross income
under section 106. Compare Treas. Reg. § 1.79-1(a)(1) & (f)(3), T.D. 7623, 1979-26
I.R.B. 7 with Treas. Reg. § 1.106-1, T.D. 6169, 1956-1 C.B. 63, 79.
Permanent benefits may be combined with term insurance under section 79 and
the I.R.S. will provide insurers with the allocation to be made between permanent
and term benefits for a particular form of policy. Rev. Proc. 79-29, 1979-22 I.R.B. 24.
The one exception to all of the rules above is life insurance incidental (as defined
in Rev. Rul. 74-307, 1974-2 C.B. 126 and Rev. Rul. 74-325, 1974-2 C.B. 127) to quali-
fied pension, annuity or profit-sharing plans. There, only the approximate value of
pure life insurance protection will be included in the employee's gross income in the
year that the plan or trust pays the premiums. See I.R.C. § 72(m) and Treas. Reg. §
1.72-16, T.D. 6676, 1963-2 C.B. 41, 47. The amount so included is determined under
the tables set forth in Revenue Ruling 55-747, 1955-2 C.B. 228, commonly referred to
as P.S. 58 Tables, or an amount equal to the current published rates of the insurer for
an individual one-year term life policy on a standard risk. Rev. Rul. 66-110, 1966-1
C.B. 12 and Rev. Rul. 67-154, 1967-1 C.B. 11. For a discussion of life insurance in
qualified plans, see Nasuti, Taxation of Life Insurance in Qualified Plans, 1979
DuKE L.J. 449.
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been a popular fringe benefit.10 Above the $50,000 level the
income imputed to an employee by the Treasury Regulations
is often less than the premium rate an employer can
negotiate.-1
In addition to the attractive employee income tax treat-
ment, the relatively low group term premium rates are advan-
tageous to the employer. Not only are the low rates achieved
through the obvious sales and administrative efficiencies
group policies enjoy' 2 - they also reflect the relatively low
mortality rates that actively working persons have compared
to those older and retired. 8
The employer will usually receive an income tax deduction
for the premiums paid for insurance policies on employees. It
should be noted that the employer's income tax deduction for
the life insurance premiums on employees does not hinge on
the classification of the policy as group term or some other
type. Deductibility of premiums depends on the reasonable-
ness of the total compensation package for employees covered
and on whether the employer is directly or indirectly a benefi-
10. "Group insurance is a near universal employee benefit in the United States."
AMERICAN COUNCIL OF LIFE INSURANCE, LIFE INSURANCE FACT BOOK 29 (1978).
11. Compare Treas. Reg. § 1.79-3(d)(2), Table 1, T.D. 7623, 1979-26 I.R.B. 7 with
1961 Standard Group Life Insurance Premium Rates, reprinted in table 34-1, S.
HUEBNER & K. BLACK, LIFE INSURANCE 408 (9th ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as HUEB-
NER & BLACK]. See also A.I.C.P.A. Insurance Trust C.P.A. Plan, on file with the Mar-
quette Law Review.
12. See HUEBNER & BLACK, supra note 11, at 398-99.
13. See Mortality Tables, AMERICAN COUNCIL OF LIFE INSURANCE, LIFE INSURANCE
FACT BOOK 108-09 (1977). Recent developments may ultimately diminish the luster of
group term life insurance as an employee fringe benefit. Because term life insurance
rates must increase with increasing mortality rates, the new requirement that retire-
ment not be mandatory before age seventy may reduce the attractiveness to the em-
ployer of group term insurance as employee compensation. See Age Discrimination in
Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 12, 92 Stat. 189 (1978)
(to be codified as 29 U.S.C. § 663a). The Senate committee indicated that it believed
the law would permit employers to continue reducing coverage for older workers or to
begin increasing the employee contribution required as the worker's age increases. S.
REP. No. 95-493, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1977).
Another problem on the horizon is increasing employee interest in post-retirement
coverage. In addition to the problem posed by the the reluctance of insurers to main-
tain coverage past age seventy, the employer faces funding difficulties. Retired lives
reserves have become a major area of controversy. For a discussion of that contro-
versy, see Salem & Schmalbeck, Group-Term Life Insurance: IRS Creates New Solu-
tions, Questions and Challenges, 51 J. TAX. 130 (1979).
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ciary of the policy.14
The cost advantage of group term coverage can also be
gained in the case of employees who contribute part or all of
the premiums. 15 In such a situation, however, the employee's
contributions are in after-tax dollars, as are premiums paid by
members of sponsoring professional or trade associations.'
But regardless of who pays the premiums, the amount of
proceeds available to an insured's beneficiaries will obviously
be diminished by the amount of any additional federal estate
tax imposed because of them.17 Thus, the estate planner
should understand as much as possible about the includibility
of group term life insurance proceeds in an insured's estate.
The proceeds of life insurance are includible in the in-
sured's gross estate under section 2042 if: (a) They are receiv-
able by the insured's personal representative (executor); and
(or) (b) The decedent possessed any incidents of ownership in
the policy at the time of death."'
"Receivable by the executor" has been broadly construed;
proceeds are so classified when received by policy beneficiaries
other than the executor when those beneficiaries are legally
bound to use them "to pay taxes, debts, or other charges en-
forceable against the estate."19 An irrevocable life insurance
trust can be structured to help meet these needs, but the
terms of the trust should effectively prohibit the trustee from
14. I.R.C. §§ 162 & 264(a)(1); see also Treas. Reg. §§ 1.162-7(b)(1), T.D. 6291,
1958-1 C.B. 63, 70 and 1.264-1, T.D. 6228, 1957-1 C.B. 109, 110. However, note that
no deduction is allowed for a single-premium contract (substantially all premiums
paid within four years of purchase or an amount deposited to cover a substantial
number of future premiums). I.R.C. § 264(a)(2), (b). Code sections 264(a)(3) and
264(c) sharply limit the use of financed plans. See also Treas. Reg. §§ 1.264-2 through
1.264-4, T.D. 6228, 1957-1 C.B. 109-11 and T.D. 6773, 1964-2 C.B. 73, 74. For a com-
parison of term life insurance to financed whole-life insurance and a discussion of
other consequences of each type, see Dann & Davis, The Dilemma of Term and Fi-
nanced Insurance, J. Am. Soc'y C.L.U., Oct. 1978, at 12.
15. See Treas. Reg. § 1.79-0, T.D. 7623, 1979-26 I.R.B. 7.
16. See Tress. Reg. §§ 1.79-0 & 1.79-1, T.D. 7623, 1979-26 I.R.B. 7. Premiums
paid by the insured are personal living expenses and no deduction is allowed. I.R.C. §
262; Treas. Reg. § 1.262-1(b)(1), T.D. 6313, 1958-2 C.B. 114, 115.
17. See I.R.C. § 2001(a)-(c). For a discussion of whether an estate is large enough
to be subject to federal estate tax, see note 7 supra.
18. I.R.C. 2042.
19. Tress. Reg. § 20.2042-1(b), T.D. 6296, 1958-2 C.B. 432, 534. See also Bintliff v.
United States, 462 F.2d 403 (5th Cir. 1972).
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paying the taxes or debts of the decedent's estate.2 0
Even if the insurance proceeds are not "payable to the ex-
ecutor," they will, nevertheless, be included in the insured's
gross estate under section 2042 if he possessed "incidents of
ownership" at the time of death.21 An insured, covered
through his employer, who made no attempt to assign his in-
terest in the policy to a third party will clearly have incidents
of ownership at his death.2 2 In addition, the insured decedent
may have possessed such incidents at death because of incom-
plete assignments, third-party attribution or third-party as-
signment to decedent. 23 But the crucial question for the estate
20. One means of removing the policy from the gross estate while retaining the
possibility of using the proceeds to provide liquidity is a carefully drafted irrevocable
inter vivos trust. Such a trust would be given the power to loan assets to the estate or
buy assets from it, but would be effectively forbidden to pay the debts and taxes of
the estate. See Rev. Rul. 73-404, 1973-2 C.B. 319. It may be possible to accomplish
this by permitting the trustee to pay the debts and taxes of the estate only if the
estate's assets are insufficient, making the trust assets part of the gross estate only if
the trust actually pays the debts and taxes, but the question is whether that is effec-
tive as a complete prohibition in the life insurance situation.
In any event, careful drafting would be required in order to retain the gift tax
annual exclusion for the premium payments, as well as to avoid other pitfalls. Com-
pare Rev. Rul. 79-47, 1979-6 I.R.B. 19 with Rev. Rul. 76-490, 1976-2 C.B. 300. See
also Hodges, Tax Planning for Gifts of Life Insurance, 11 TAx ADVISER 4, 12-16
(1980); Keydel, "Irrevocable Insurance Trusts: The Current Scene," U. Miami loth
Inst. on Est. Plan. 500 (1976).
21. I.R.C. § 2042.
22. Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c), T.D. 7623, 1979-26 I.R.B. 7.
23. Treasury Regulation § 20.2042-1(c), T.D. 7623, 1979-26 I.R.B. 7, sets out the
basic tests for incidents of ownership. While a complete discussion of incidents of
ownership is beyond the scope of this paper, a few examples should be mentioned.
Revenue Ruling 79-117, 1979-15 I.R.B. 12, suggests that the value of an insured dece-
dent's power to designate disposition of insurance proceeds can be reduced to less
than 5% of the proceeds, thus escaping inclusion in the decedent's gross estate, by
making the exercise of the power contingent upon surviving the policyowner and re-
serving the right to revoke the power. A related issue is whether the use of a revoca-
ble beneficiary designation to create a power makes it a power over a mere expec-
tancy rather than a power to appoint property. The Tax Court has held that there is
no property to which such a power can attach for purposes of section 2041 and that
such a power is not an incident of ownership. Estate of Margrave, 71 T.C. 13 (1978).
The power in Margrave was the insured decedent's power to revoke or amend his
revocable inter vivos trust. The trust was named under a revocable beneficiary desig-
nation as beneficary of an insurance policy owned by the decedent's wife. Id.
A corporation's incidents of ownership will be attributed to a sole or controlling
stockholder to require inclusion of proceeds to the extent the proceeds are not paya-
ble to, or for the benefit of, the corporation. Estate of Levy, 70 T.C. 873 (1978). See
also Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c)(6), T.D. 7623, 1979-26 I.R.B. 7 (but that regulation
also states that the power of the corporation to surrender or cancel a policy qualified
[Vol. 63:275
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planner and the insured policyowner is whether the incidents
of ownership of a group term policy (and proceeds) can be
successfully removed from the insured's estate by an
assignment.
I. ASSIGNMENT OF CONVERSION RIGHTS IN GROUP TERM
POLICIES
Treasury regulations have long classified the power to sur-
render or cancel a life insurance policy as an incident of own-
ership.24 However, with respect to employer-paid group term
life insurance the Internal Revenue Service (I.R.S. or the Ser-
vice) has acknowledged that the power to cancel an insurance
policy solely by terminating employment is not an incident of
ownership; such a power is merely "a collateral consequence
of the power that every employee has to terminate his
employment. '25
for favorable income tax treatment under section 79 will not be attributed to the
stockholder).
The right to change the time or manner in which proceeds are paid to the benefi-
ciary by changing a settlement option has been held an incident of ownership. Estate
of Lumpkin v. Commissioner, 474 F.2d 1092 (5th Cir. 1973). Contra, Estate of Con-
nelly, Sr. v. United States, 551 F.2d 545 (3d Cir. 1977). The courts are also divided on
the question of whether the decedents possession of incidents of ownership in a
fiduciary capacity requires inclusion in his gross estate regardless of circumstances.
See Terriberry v. United States, 517 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S.
977 (1976); Estate of Skifter v. Commissioner, 468 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1972); Estate of
Fruehauf v. Commissioner, 427 F.2d 80 (6th Cir. 1970). But see Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-
1(c)(4), T.D. 7312, 1974-1 C.B. 277, 278. See also Rev. Rul. 76-261, 1976-2 C.B. 276.
The Internal Revenue Service has taken the position that the power to cancel a
group term policy solely by terminating employment is not an incident of ownership.
Rev. Rul. 72-307, 1972-1 C.B. 307. At least under some circumstances, the I.R.S. also
does not view an employee's right to later apply for group insurance as an incident of
ownership, provided that the right is contingent upon an existing third party owner's
ceasing to qualify as an eligible owner. Rev. Rul. 76-421, 1976-2 C.B. 280. An em-
ployee's right to prevent cancellation of a policy owned by the employer may be an
incident of ownership. Rev. Rul. 79-46, 1979-6 I.R.B. 17. Though the situation in Rev-
enue Ruling 79-46 was one in which the employer named the employee's spouse as
beneficiary, the same principle could be used to include in the employee's gross estate
a key man policy payable to the employer, provided that the employee has the power
to prevent cancellation (by purchase or other means, presumably). However, the Tax
Court has since rejected this view where a key man policy was payable to the corpora-
tion and the deceased employee did not have a significant stock ownership interest.
See Estate of Smith, 73 T.C. No. 27, 1 73.27 P-H T.C. (1979).
24. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c)(2), T.D. 7312, 1974-1 C.B. 277, 278.
25. Rev. Rul. 72-307, 1972-1 C.B. 307. This ruling is consistent with the holdings
of two cases decided before it was issued. Estate of Lumpkin v. Commissioner, 56
T.C. 815 (1971), rev'd on other grounds, 474 F.2d 1092 (5th Cir. 1973); Landorf v.
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This ruling probably does not extend to a situation in
which the policyowner has a contractual or statutory right to
convert the coverage from term to whole life, and failure to
convert by the end of the term will permit the coverage to
lapse.26 Lapse of insurance coverage due to failure to exercise
a conversion right is something more than a collateral conse-
quence of the insured's power to terminate his employment.
Such a conversion right would thus constitute an incident of
ownership, causing inclusion of the policy in the insured's
gross estate. Therefore, an insured under a group term policy
would be well advised to assign away any existing conversion
rights.17 In fact, for a time, the I.R.S. required that group
term policies be convertible as a prerequisite to their assigna-
bility.28 The response was a flurry of enabling-clarifying state
legislation as to both assignability and convertibility.2 9 Aside
from statutory requirements, the provisions of the master pol-
icy for each group generally determine the formalities needed
United States, 408 F.2d 461 (Ct. Cl. 1969).
26. See Rev. Rul. 69-54, 1969-1 C.B. 221.
27. See Rev. Rul. 69-54, Situation 3, 1969-1 C.B. 221. Statutory conversion rights
may also affect the completeness of the assignment. For example, the Wisconsin stat-
ute creating conversion rights for group life insurance policies gives the insurer the
right to terminate the master policy, or amend it to exclude classes of persons, during
the first five years that the policy is in effect without providing conversion rights for
the persons whose coverage is so terminated. Wis. STAT. § 632.57(4)(1977). Thus, the
right to convert upon termination or amendment takes effect five years after coverage
begins. Id. The question then becomes whether a present assignment of that right can
be made before the right exists. As a minimum, the language of the assignment docu-
ment would have to specifically cover both existing conversion rights and any conver-
sion rights subsequently created. It would appear that the Service's position would be
that the assignment, if effective at all, takes effect for estate tax purposes when the
conversion right becomes enforceable. See Rev. Rul. 79-231, 1979-31 I.R.B. 9. Obvi-
ously, there would be similar problems if a policy were assigned in a state lacking a
conversion statute and the state later enacted one. Therefore, it is highly desirable
that the policy contract specifically provide for conversion rights upon termination of
employment or membership in the eligible group and upon termination or amend-
ment of the group policy.
28. Rev. Rul. 69-54, Situation 3, 1969-1 C.B. 221.
29. Murphy, Assignment of Group Life Insurance for the Purpose of Estate Tax
Avoidance, 55 TAXES 476, 478 n.19 (1977). See, e.g., 1975 Wis. Laws, ch. 375, (codified
as Wis. STAT. §§ 632.47 & 632.57 (1977)). A note in the session law states that section
632.47 was intended to permit Wisconsin residents to make effective assignments
under Revenue Ruling 68-334. (Revenue Ruling 69-54, 1969-1 C.B. 221 changed this
ruling in only one respect: it sought to make clear that the word "solely" did not
mean that any incident of ownership could be safely retained merely by requiring
that it be exercisable only in conjunction with another person.)
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for an effective assignment.3 0 Even prohibitions stated in an
individual policy certificate may not be binding if they are not
reflected in the master policy.$'
II. THE REVIVAL OF THE PREMIUM PAYMENT TEST
Even before conceding that the incidents of ownership of a
group term life insurance policy were assignable, the Service
attempted to reach a portion of life insurance proceeds under
section 2035, the section which brings gifts made within three
years of death back into the decedent's gross estate. The
means used was the resurrection of the payment of premium
test that was deleted from the 1954 Code for purposes of sec-
tion 2042.32 In Revenue Ruling 67-463 the I.R.S. applied some
rather novel reasoning to conclude that premiums paid by an
insured within three years of death - as a proportion of total
30. It has been held that no effective assignment can be made where the master
policy prohibits assignment, despite a state statute specifically authorizing assign-
ment. Estate of Bartlett v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 1590 (1970). Because the statute in
Bartlett was an enabling statute which merely validated assignments made pursuant
to the terms of any given policy, it would seem that a statute sharply restricting the
insurer's right to prohibit assignments would control over a master policy provision
which prohibited assignment. E.g., 1975 Wis. Laws, ch. 375, (codified as Wis. STAT. §
632.47 (1977)) (A note in the session law strongly implies that a complete prohibition
of assignment in the master policy will have no effect under the statute.) Although
Revenue Ruling 79-231, 1979-31 I.R.B. 9, stops just short of stating that an assign-
ment is ineffective for estate tax purposes unless effective as against the insurer, one
writer has suggested that the I.R.S. lacks standing to assert a nonassignability clause
as a bar to valid transfer and indicates that this argument should be especially effec-
tive if the insurer has waived the clause or state courts have refused to enforce it (and
presumably also if state statute holds such a bar ineffective for any purpose but
avoiding double payment). See Murphy, Assignment of Group Life Insurance for the
Purpose of Estate Tax Avoidance, 55 TAXEs 476, 479 n.26 & 27, 484 n.71 (1977).
31. Estate of Gorby v. Commissioner, 53 T.C. 80 (1969).
32. See Rev. Rul. 67-463, 1967-2 C.B. 327. Under the 1939 Code, the predecessor
of section 2042 taxed the proceeds of policies owned by the named beneficiary or a
third-party owner if the insured decedent directly or indirectly paid the premiums.
Rev. Act of 1942, § 404, 56 Stat. 944 (1942) (codified at I.R.C. § 811(g)(2)(A) (1939
Code)) (repealed 1954). This provision was deleted when the Code was revised and
renumbered in 1954. See I.R.C. § 2042 (1954 Code). The congressional committee
reports stated that the payment of premiums was not a relevant factor for determin-
ing taxability under section 2042. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A316
(1954); S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 472 (1954).
The I.R.S. apparently began using the premium payment theory to attempt to
reach proceeds of policies never owned by the insured decedent (or transferred more
than three years before death) in approximately 1962 and included a discussion of
that position in its 1965 field manual. Simmons, "Contemplation of Death Aspects of
Life Insurance," U. Miami 2d Inst. on Est. Plan., 68.1106 & n.53 (1968).
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premiums paid - required inclusion of a pro rata portion of
the insurance proceeds in the insured's estate. 33
The newly revived theory fared poorly in the courts. First,
in Gorman v. United States, in the context of a premium pay-
ment by the insured for a term policy purchased within three
years of death, a federal district court chose to focus on the
history of section 2035 and bring back only the specific assets
transferred within three years of death." Thus, it concluded
that only the premiums paid by the insured during that pe-
riod were includible in the insured's estate.3 5
Next the Tax Court, in Estate of Coleman v. Commis-
sioner noted that Congress enacted section 2035 to prevent
the diversion of assets from an estate, and concluded that
only the actual premiums paid by the insured decedent during
the three years before death were so diverted.3 6 As the court
observed that the payment of premium test had been abol-
ished with respect to section 2042, the court was, in effect,
holding that the test was similarly irrelevant under section
2035. 3
The Tax Court noted that the premiums merely main-
tained the policyowner's rights under the policy; they neither
created nor recreated them.38 Thus, no new interest was being
transferred within three years of death by the payment of pre-
miums during that period, exempting the interest from inclu-
sion under section 2035. The Fifth Circuit endorsed this
maintenance of rights theory in First National Bank of Mid-
land v. United States.3 9 In rejecting the payment of premium
test, the Fifth Circuit held that the right to life insurance pro-
ceeds vested in the owner at the policy's inception. The court
emphasized that the daughter-owner of the policy could just
as easily have paid the premiums herself and was under no
duty to allow her father, the insured, to pay them. Under
these circumstances the court concluded that the insured's
premium payments were essentially cash gifts, rather than a
33. 1967-2 C.B. 327.
34. Gorman v. United States, 288 F. Supp. 225 (E.D. Mich. 1968).
35. Id.
36. Estate of Coleman v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 921 (1969).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 423 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1970).
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transfer of insurance proceeds, so that none of the proceeds
was includible under section 2035.40
The courts were apparently not accepting the theory that
each premium payment transferred a pro rata portion of the
proceeds. In Bel v. United States, however, the Service was
successful in persuading the Fifth Circuit to salvage the pre-
mium payment test, at least with respect to a term policy re-
newed within three years of death.4 1
Bel involved an annually renewable accidental death policy
owned by the insured's children and originally purchased
more than three years before the insured's death. 2 Because
the policy was renewed annually, the Service* contended that
only the most recently paid premium engendered all of the
rights under the policy.43
The district court had accepted the government's position
that the premium payments fell within the terms of section
2035, but found that insufficient to require the inclusion of
the entire policy proceeds in the insured's gross estate." The
court followed essentially the same line of reasoning as did the
Tax Court in the Coleman case: if the payment of premiums
no longer required inclusion of the policy proceeds under sec-
tion 2042, it followed that the mere payment of premiums
could not constitute a transfer of an interest in the policy pro-
ceeds for purposes of section 2035.:1
One week after the district court ruled for the taxpayer in
Bel, the Fifth Circuit issued its decision in Midland.4" In Mid-
land, it will be recalled, the court rejected the theory that the
payment of premiums on a policy brought into existence more
than three years before the insured's death could amount to a
transfer of an interest in that policy.47 But in Bel, the Fifth
Circuit, in overruling the district court, reached the opposite
result with respect to the payment of the premiums on the
40. Id.
41. See Bel v. United States, 452 F.2d 683 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S.
919 (1972).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Bel v. United States, 310 F. Supp. 1189 (W.D. La. 1970), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part & remanded, 452 F.2d 683 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 919 (1972).
45. Id.
46. First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 423 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1970).
47. Id.
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policy in that case.4
The court asserted the distinction lay in the nature of the
annually renewable policy before it, finding that each renewal
essentially created a new policy.49 Thus, the policy was
brought into being within three years of death, but section
2035 also requires that a transfer be made by the decedent
within three years of death.5 0 The Tax Court in Coleman had,
after all, pointed out that the purpose of section 2035 was to
prevent the diversion of assets from the decedent's estate
prior to death.51 What more was diverted in Bel than the
amount of the premiums paid?
To grapple with this problem the Bel court, in effect, re-
jected the "diversion" theory of section 2035 and adopted an
"indirect transfer" theory. 52 The court based this theory on
the United States Supreme Court case, Chase National Bank
v. United States.5 3 The taxpayer in Chase had contended that
the estate taxation of life insurance proceeds was an unconsti-
tutional direct tax. It could not be classified as a tax on the
privilege of transfer, since the proceeds were transferred by
the insurance company, not by the insured. The Court dis-
posed of this argument by broadly interpreting the notion of a
transfer by the decedent as including the situation where a
third party was induced by the decedent, who controlled the
disposition of the proceeds until his death, to make a trans-
fer.5 4 Lifting this reasoning from the very different context of
the Chase case, the Fifth Circuit applied it to hold that the
48. Bel v. United States, 452 F.2d 683 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 919
(1972).
49. Apparently the court meant that the policies at issue in those cases were
whole life policies rather than annually renewable term policies. The Midland opin-
ion does imply a whole life policy, but nowhere does the Coleman opinion indicate
whether the policy in that case was term or whole life. See Bel v. United States, 452
F.2d 683 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 919 (1972); First Nat'l Bank v. United
States, 423 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1970); Estate of Coleman v. Commissioner, 52 T.C.
921 (1969).
50. Section 2035 applies to transfers from the decedent within three years of
death and has been substantially unchanged (except for removal of the contemplation
of death requirement in 1976) from its predecessor section in the 1939 Code. See
I.R.C. § 811(c) (1939 Code) (current version at I.R.C. § 2035).
51. Estate of Coleman v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 921 (1969).
52. See 452 F.2d at 691-92.
53. 278 U.S. 327 (1929).
54. Id. at 338-39.
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renewal of a term policy, rather than its initial creation, was
the operative transfer of the policy." Chase does indeed hold
that the fact that the policy proceeds come from the insurer
does not bar ascribing them to the insured for purposes of
considering him to have transferred them.58 But that does not
compel a conclusion as to when that transfer is to be consid-
ered to have taken place with respect to a renewable term pol-
icy. The Fifth Circuit's view that a renewal premium buys a
discrete policy, and that payment of the renewal premium by
the insured constitutes an indirect transfer of a new policy
does not follow from the Court's reasoning in Chase. Rather,
this view grafts the old section 2042 premium payment test
onto Chase, overlooking the fact that the insured has surren-
dered all of his ownership rights, including the right to desig-
nate the beneficiary, long before paying the last renewal
premium.57
III. POLICIES FIRST PURCHASED (OR ASSIGNED) WITHIN
THREE YEARS OF DEATH
Other circuits have applied the Bel payment of premium
rationale to life insurance policies never owned by the insured,
but first purchased within three years of death. Since inclu-
sion of the proceeds in the gross estate was, in these cases,
required solely because of the date of purchase or assignment,
no distinctions between whole life and term policies were
required. 59
55. See 452 F.2d at 690-92.
56. 278 U.S. at 338-39.
57. Cf. Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c)(2), T.D. 7312, 1974-1 C.B. 277, 278 (listing some
of the incidents of ownership which must be surrendered to avoid taxation under
I.R.C. § 2042).
58. First Nat'l Bank of Oregon v. United States, 488 F.2d 575 (9th Cir. 1973);
Detroit Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 467 F.2d 964 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
410 U.S. 929 (1973). If a policy is assigned within three years of the insured's death,
the assignment itself fulfills the transfer requirement, removing the need for the pre-
mium payment test. See, e.g., Estate of Silverman v. Commissioner, 521 F.2d 574 (2d
Cir. 1975); Peters v. United States, 572 F.2d 851 (Ct. Cl. 1978) (In Silverman, only a
pro rata share of the proceeds was included in the gross estate where the assignee
paid the premiums after the assignment. Though the Second Circuit affirmed the
lower court's decision, it expressed doubt about this result and indicated that it
might have held oppositely if this issue had been appealed.)
59. See First Nat'l Bank of Oregon v. United States, 488 F.2d 575, 576 & n.2 (9th
Cir. 1973).
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Transfers of life insurance policies within three years of
death are affected by a recent amendment to section 2035.0
The Revenue Act of 1978 requires that the gross estate of a
decedent dying after 1976 include "any transfer with respect
to a life insurance policy" made after 1976 and within three
years of death.61 According to the committee reports, pre-
mium payments are excepted from section 2035, to the extent
they are not required to have been included on a gift tax re-
turn because of the $3,000 annual exclusion, unless they
would have "resulted in the inclusion in the gross estate of the
proceeds of the policy under law prior to the 1976 Act if the
transfer were made within three years of death." 2 The com-
mittee reports made reference to the premium payment test
as an example of a circumstance which would have required
inclusion under prior law. At the same time, the reports also
imply that premium payments which, together with other
gifts to the same donee, do not aggregate to more than $3,000
in a year will be covered by the exclusion from section 2035.83
It is thus not clear to what extent the premium payment test
applies under section 2035, so the ambiguities surrounding the
premium payment test continue.6 4 The open-ended phrase
60. Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 702(f), I.R.C. § 2035(b).
61. See id. Transfers of other property within three years of death are not taxed
unless required to be included in a gift tax return under section 6019 of the Code. Id.
at (b)(2). Code section 6019 exempts transfers excluded by Code section 2503(b),
which in turn excludes $3,000 of the aggregate value of gifts made to any one donee
during a taxable year (unless it is a gift of a future interest). Note also that the lan-
guage of section 702(f) of the Act (codified at I.R.C. section 2035(b)), is broad enough
to require that the entire value of aggregate gifts exceeding $3,000 (for the year) at
the time of transfer be included (no deduction of the $3,000 annual exclusion). In
addition, the value of the gift to be included in the gross estate is "grossed-up" by the
amount of any gift tax paid. I.R.C. § 2035(c). These amendments apply to the estates
of all decedents dying after December 31, 1976, but only as to transfers made after
that date. Id.
62. S. REP. No. 95-745, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 87 (1978); H.R. REP. No. 95-700, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 74 (1977). See also STAFF REPORT OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION,
95th Cong., 2d Sess., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE AcT OF 1978, at 429
(March 12, 1979).
63. See reports cited note 62 supra.
64. See text accompanying notes 70-95 infra. Prior to the 1976 Act, transfers
made within three years of death were included in the gross estate if the decedent
made them "in contemplation of death." I.R.C. § 2035 (1954 Code prior to amend-
ment by the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 95-455, § 2001(a)(5)(d)(1)).
In contrast, Wisconsin inheritance tax law still uses a two-year rebuttable pre-
sumption of transfer in contemplation of death. WIS. STAT. § 72.12(4)(a) (1977). After
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"any transfer with respect to a life insurance policy" may be
particularly vexing to pursue: amounts may be small and
transfers indirect and obscure.6 5 But a rather small premium
can transfer a substantial amount of group term life insurance
proceeds.66
Another development worthy of note is the recent ruling
that the three-year period begins anew if the employer or
group changes insurance carriers, even though the new policy
is identical to the old one.67 The Service rejected the view that
a yet-to-be-acquired policy can be presently assigned, even
where the purported assignment is binding under state law.68
While this position is consistent with past rulings on the as-
signability of group term life insurance,6 9 bringing this point
out into the open should cause knowledgeable employers to
hesitate to change group carriers if valued employees have
previously assigned their policies.
IV. POLICIES INITIALLY PURCHASED OR ASSIGNED MORE
THAN THREE YEARS BEFORE DEATH
Because most group insurance policies are renewable an-
nually or monthly,70 the degree of acceptance of the Bel hold-
the two-year period has expired, a transfer may be taxed under section 72.12(4)(a),
but the burden has shifted to the state to prove that the transfer was made in con-
templation of death. Will of Daniels, 225 Wis. 502, 274 N.W. 435 (1937). It has rarely
been possible to remove the contemplation of death presumption as to life insurance.
Wolfson, "Gifts Within Three Years of Death Under the Tax Reform Act of 1976 -
Contemplation of Death: A Dying Issue," 35th N.Y.U. Inst. on Fed. Tax. 1429, 1444
(1977). However, a group term life insurance policy was once successfully shown not
to have been transferred in contemplation of death. Landorf v. United States, 408
F.2d 461 (Ct. Cl. 1969). Though the case is not controlling under Wisconsin inheri-
tance tax law, the pattern of lifetime giving used there to rebut the presumption has
been recognized in Wisconsin. See, e.g., Estate of Ga~lun, 215 Wis. 314, 254 N.W. 542
(1934). But cf. Estate of Compton v. Commissioner, 532 F.2d 1086 (6th Cir. 1976)
(difficulty of establishing a pattern of lifetime giving).
65. Examples include premium payments by the employer, premium payments to
a plan administrator rather than an insurance company, and decedent's failure to
retain the plan booklet or records of an assignment.
66. See 1979 monthly rates per $1,000 of coverage, A.I.C.P.A. Insurance Trust
C.P.A. Plan, on file with the Marquette Law Review; annual premiums per $1,000 of
coverage, HUEBNER & BLACK, supra note 11, at 408, table 34-1.
67. Rev. Rul. 79-231, 1979-31, I.R.B. 9.
68. Id.
69. See Rev. Rul. 72-307, 1972-1 C.B. 307; Rev. Rul. 69-54, 1969-1 C.B. 221; Rev.
Rul. 68-334, 1968-1 C.B. 403.
70. HUEBNER & BLACK, supra note 11, at 407-09; W. MEYER, LIFE AND HEALTH
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ing that each renewal premium purchases a new policy71 will
determine whether the proceeds of a group term insurance
policy on the life of a premium-paying decedent can ever be
beyond the reach of section 2035.72 Having the insured's em-
ployer pay the premiums will not eliminate the problem for
the employee will be considered to have made a constructive
gift to the policy owner.7 The staff of the Joint Committee on
Taxation implied early in 1979 that policy renewal rights are
relevant to the includibility of proceeds under section 2035,
but a discussion will show that the law is unclear on this
point.
The annually renewed policy in BelJ7 5 was an accidental
death policy, but some writers have expressed the view that
the same principles would require inclusion of an annually re-
newable term life insurance policy in the gross estate of the
premium-paying insured.76 The Fifth Circuit, after Bel, made
an ambiguous statement, in Bintliff v. United States, that
could be interpreted as either limiting or overruling Bel:
It is settled law in this court that the premiums paid in con-
templation of death, not the whole of the life insurance pro-
ceeds, are includable in the decedent's gross estate under
Section 2035. See First National Bank of Midland v. United
States. But see Bel v. United States.'7
The government had argued that the policies insuring dece-
INSURANCE LAW § 3:2 (1972 & 1978 Supps.) [hereinafter cited as MEYER].
71. Bel v. United States, 452 F.2d 683 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 919
(1972).
72. See text accompanying notes 41-59 supra.
73. Rev. Rul. 76-490, 1976-2 C.B. 300. Some courts have treated an employer's
premium payments as constructive gifts with little or no discussion of the issue. See,
e.g., Estate of Compton v. Commissioner, 532 F.2d 1086 (6th Cir. 1976); Landorf v.
United States, 408 F.2d 461 (Ct. Cl. 1969).
74. STAFF REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, 95th Cong., 2d Seas.,
GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE AcT OF 1978, at 429 (March 12, 1979).
75. Bel v. United States, 452 F.2d 683 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 919
(1972).
76. See, e.g., Eliasberg, Contemplation of Death and the Estate Taxation of Life
Insurance, 111 TRusTs & EST. 690 (1972); Roberts & Shelnut, Recent Developments,
Federal Estate Taxation of Insurance Under Internal Revenue Code Sections 2042
and 2035, J. Am. Soc'Y C.L.U., July 1974, at 8; Current Development, Insurance Poli-
cies Transferred in Contemplation of Death - The Premium Payment Test Re-
vived? 44 COLO. L. REv. 633 (1972-73).
77. Bintliff v. United States, 462 F.2d 403 (5th Cir. 1972) (citations omitted).
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dent's life first purchased by his wife five and six years before
his death were includible in his estate under section 2035 by
virtue of the decedent's premium payments within three years
of death.7s The court held that decedent's community prop-
erty incidents of ownership (section 2042) had been effectively
conveyed prior to the three year period and cited Midland as
authority for the proposition that only the premiums paid
within three years of death would be included under section
2035. 9
The applicability of Bintliff to annually renewable term
policies assigned more than three years before death is un-
clear. The second policy in that case arose from the conver-
sion of two term insurance policies owned by the insured's
wife, which took place within three years of his death. A new
assignment instrument was executed at that time.80 The ques-
tion of whether this constituted a new assignment within
three years of death was discussed by neither the district
court nor the Fifth Circuit.8 ' Nor did either court address the
issue of whether the decreasing term policies in Bintliff were
distinguishable from the annually renewable policy in Bel for
purposes of determining whether each renewal premium pur-
chased a new policy. 2 Indeed, neither the district court nor
the Fifth Circuit even mentioned that there might be a differ-
ence in this respect between a whole life policy and a term
policy renewed within three years of death. 3 Apparently the
Fifth Circuit intended to leave the door sufficiently open in
Bintliff to enable it to distinguish the case easily if it should
78. Bintliff v. United States, 329 F. Supp. 1356 (E.D. Tex. 1971), rev'd on other
grounds, 462 F.2d 403 (5th Cir. 1972).
79. Bintliff v. United States, 462 F.2d 403 (5th Cir. 1972). If the insured decedent
has not executed an effective control clause showing clear intent to make a gift of his
or her community property interest in the policy, the incidents of ownership thus
retained will subject one-half of the proceeds to estate taxation under section 2042.
Simply naming one's spouse as owner does not overcome the rebuttable presumption
of community property raised by the payment of premiums from community funds.
See, e.g., Freedman v. United States, 382 F.2d 742 (5th Cir. 1967); Estate of Madsen
v. Commissioner, 1979 T.C.M. 289, P-H Memo T.C. 79,289 (1979), appeal taken,
(9th Cir. Nov. 13, 1979).
80. 462 F.2d at 404-05.
81. See Bintliff v. United States, 329 F. Supp. 1356 (E.D. Tex. 1971), rev'd on
other grounds, 462 F.2d 403 (5th Cir. 1972).
82. See district court and fifth circuit opinions cited note 81 supra.
83. See district court and fifth circuit opinions cited note 81 supra.
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choose to continue to apply Bel to annually renewable policies
assigned more than three years before death.
Another case, decided by the Fifth Circuit within months
after Bel, also creates some ambiguity about how the court
would treat the facts of Bel in the future.8 4 In Parson v.
United States, as in Bel, the policy at issue was an accidental
death policy originally assigned to a family member more
than three years before the death of the insured.8 5 The gov-
ernment argued in the district court that each premium pur-
chased a one-year policy. 6 The Parson and Bel appeals were
tried before two different panels of Fifth Circuit judges.87 The
circuit court opinion in Parson does not indicate whether the
section 2035 issue had been appealed or whether the court
was aware of the Bel decision; it focuses instead on the effec-
tiveness of the control clause transferring the decedent's com-
munity property incidents of ownership. 8 At most, the opin-
ion indicates a willingness to let the district court's rejection
of the Section 2035 argument stand. Although Parson was
later cited somewhat ambiguously in Bintliff, the Bintliff
court seemed primarily concerned with the effectiveness of
the Parson control clause.89 The Fifth Circuit has subse-
quently followed Bel where the initial assignment of a flight
insurance policy was made immediately before death,90 but
Bintliff appears to be the court's latest word about life insur-
ance policies purchased or assigned more than three years
before death.
Even if Bintliff or Parson were to be viewed as having
clearly overruled Bel in the Fifth Circuit, it would appear that
dicta in one circuit court case would be the only obstacle to a
renewal of the premium payment argument in other circuits."1
The issue remains undiscussed in other circuits because they
have been faced only with policies initially purchased or as-
84. Parson v. United States, 460 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1972).
85. Compare id. with Bel v. United States, 452 F.2d 683 (5th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 919 (1972).
86. Parson v. United States, 308 F. Supp. 1159 (E.D. Tex. 1970), rev'd on other
grounds, 460 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1972).
87. See cases cited at note 85 supra.
88. See 460 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1972).
89. See Bintliff v. United States, 462 F.2d 403 (5th Cir. 1972).
90. Berman v. United States, 487 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1973).
91. See Silverman v. Commissioner, 521 F.2d 574 (2d Cir. 1975).
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signed within three years of death.92
The existing revenue rulings dealing with annually renewa-
ble term insurance under section 2035 are sufficiently narrow
to permit revival of the "annual transfer by premium" argu-
ment without having to revoke a single ruling.9 3 Revenue Rul-
ing 71-497 uses broad transfer reasoning like that in Bel for
its discussion of an accidental death policy purchased nine
months before death, but leaves open the question of whether
the same reasoning would be applied to the renewal of an an-
nually renewable accidental death or group term policy pur-
chased or assigned more than three years before death. 4 The
ruling also fails to state whether the one-year accidental death
policy purchased nine months before death was renewable,
thus easily avoiding the issue of whether guaranteed-renewa-
ble l olicies would be viewed differently from policies renewa-
ble only at the option of the insurer.95
Revenue Ruling 79-231 holds that an employer's change of
insurance carriers is a purchase of a new policy, and the same
principles seem equally applicable to any group's change of
carrier.9 6 It may be reasonable to infer from that position that
it is otherwise not deemed to be a new purchase made when-
ever a premium is paid, but the ruling does not necessarily
imply that the policy would not be includible if the employer
had not changed carriers.9 7 The discussion is carefully con-
fined solely to the consequences of changing carriers within
three years of death.9 8 This revenue ruling may or may not be
the first stage of a new drive to tax group term life insurance
under section 2035. Additional cases or legislation will be nec-
essary before the status of annually renewable policies under
the premium payment test of section 2035 can be deemed
92. See cases cited at note 58 supra.
93. Rev. Rul. 79-231, 1979-31 I.R.B. 9; Rev. Rul. 71-497, 1971-2 C.B. 329. Note,
however, that the "annual transfer by premium" position would render basic section
2042 assignability rulings meaningless where the premiums are paid by the insured
decedent or his employer, yet other rulings impose gift tax liability upon such trans-
fers. See notes 26-30 supra and accompanying text. See also Rev. Rul. 79-47, 1979-6
I.R.B. 17 and Rev. Rul. 76-490, 1976-2 C.B. 300.
94. See Rev. Rul. 71-497, 1971-2 C.B. 329.
95. See id.
96. Rev. Rul. 79-231, 1979-31 I.R.B. 9.
97. See id.
98. See id.
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settled.
The five-year renewable group term life policy is somewhat
less vulnerable under the Service's view of the premium pay-
ment test. Revenue Ruling 71-497 states that such a policy is
outside the scope of section 2035 in the case of a policy pur-
chased four years before the death of the insured. 9 It is left
unclear in the ruling whether renewal of the policy would
start the three-year premium payment test period over again
and whether the I.R.S. would view guaranteed renewability
differently from renewability at the option of the insurer.100 It
would also appear that the principles of Revenue Ruling 79-
231 would be applicable to a change of carrier at the expira-
tion of the term,10' but a five-year policy contract would at
least reduce the frequency of the insured's exposure to that
danger.
V. Is A DISTINCTION BETWEEN TERM LIFE INSURANCE AND
WHOLE LIFE INSURANCE DEFENSIBLE FOR ESTATE TAX
PURPOSES?
If an insured dies within three years after assigning the in-
cidents of ownership in a life insurance policy, it is clear that
the entire amount of the proceeds will be part of the estate for
tax purposes, regardless of whether the policy was term or
whole life.10 2 It is also settled that if an insured survives the
assignment (or purchase by another) of a whole life policy by
more than three years, the proceeds will not be part of the
estate even though the insured actually or constructively paid
the premiums during the three years precedding death.103
As discussed in the precepding sections, what is left unset-
tled by case law is the question of whether an insured, who is
deemed to have continued to pay the premiums and survives
the assignment (or initial purchase by a third party) of an an-
nually renewable term life insurance policy by more than
three years, will have the proceeds included in his gross es-
99. Rev. RuL 71-497, 1971-2 C.B. 329.
100. See id.
101. See Rev. Rul. 79-231, 1979-31 I.R.B. 9.
102. See I.R.C. § 2035. See also Peters v. United States, 572 F.2d 851 (Ct. Cl.
1978).
103. Rev. Rul. 71-497, 1971-2 C.B. 329. See also text accompanying notes 34-37 &
49 supra.
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tate. Some writers have concluded that the proceeds should
be so includible.10 4 This view, in the author's opinion, results
from an exaggeration of the significance of certain distinctions
between whole life and term insurance policies.
These distinctions are: (a) the, manner of funding the pro-
ceeds; and (b) the extent of the policyowner's resulting right
to maintain an interest in the policy after ceasing to pay pre-
miums. 10 5 It has been argued on the basis of these distinctions
that a whole life policy is a different species of contract from a
term policy because different consequences flow from the ces-
sation of premium payments.10 6 It will be shown that while
the contract provisions for funding and continuation may
have certain gift tax or income tax implications during an in-
sured's life, they have no influence on the proceeds received
by a'beneficiary upon the death of the insured.1 07 Thus, it will
be demonstrated, in the author's view, that there is nothing
inherent in the nature of term policy proceeds which would
justify distinguising their death tax treatment from that of
the proceeds of a whole life policy.
A. The Significance of Funding
A whole life policy is an installment purchase of the single
premium cost for whole life protection computed at the in-
sured's age of issue.108 Consistent with other types of long
term debt amortization payments, the early payments (premi-
ums) are largely expenses and prefunding of insurance cost,
with a slowly building equity (described by such industry
104. See Dodge, Substantial Ownership and Substance Versus Form: Proposals
for the Unification of Federal Estate and Gift Taxes and for the Taxation of Gener-
ation-skipping Transfers, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 657, 703-08; Current Developments, In-
surance Policies Transferred in Contemplation of Death - The Premium Payment
Test Revived? 44 COLO. L. REv. 633 (1972-73).
105. See HUEBNER & BLACK, supra note 11, at 5-7, 139-40; H. KRUEGER & L. WAG-
GONER, The Life Insurance Policy Contract 194 (1953); Williams, Contracts - Whole
Life and Endowment, in LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE HANDBOOK 66 (D. Gregg & V.
Lucas ed. 1973).
106. See authorities cited at note 104 supra.
107. See HUEBNER & BLACK, supra note 11, at 4-8; MEYER, supra note 70, at § 3:1;
Mehr, The Concept of the Level-Premium Whole Life Insurance Policy - Reexam-
ined, 1975 J. OF RISK & INS. 419. [hereinafter cited as Mehr].
108. Mehr, supra note 107, at 423-25. See also HUEBNER & BLACK, supra note 11,
at 268.
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terms as "cash surrender value" or "non-forfeiture value."). 10 9
Were single premium coverage to be purchased, that single
premium would be merely the discounted value of the annual
term insurance premiums otherwise payable over a lifetime.
Thus the spreading of payments over the remaining lifetime
of the insured is just a funding mechanism which makes a ma-
jor purchase affordable by large numbers of persons. 1" 0 Natu-
rally, the equity which builds over time can be used in a vari-
ety of ways: to secure a (policy) loan; to buy a paid-up policy
of lesser face value if the premiums are discontinued (i.e., a
single premium policy at the insured's then-attained age equal
in cost to the amount of the equity built up to that point); to
buy term insurance if premiums are discontinued; or to pro-
vide cash upon surrender of the policy."'
In contrast to the whole life funding mechanism, annually
renewable term insurance premiums merely pay for each
year's coverage. 1 2 These costs are lower in a person's younger
years than they are as he grows older, reflecting the normal
mortality risk inherent in life insurance."' In a whole life pol-
109. See HUEBNER & BLACK, supra note 11, at 291-92, 307-08, table 26-3 at 317;
Williams, Contracts - Whole Life and Endowment, in LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE
HANDBOOK 70, table 6-3 (D. Gregg & V. Lucas ed. 1973).
110. The gross level premium for a insurance policy consists of a net premium
plus an amount to cover expenses and contingencies (loading). HUEBNER & BLACK,
supra note 11, at 253-54. The net level premium, in turn, is based on the net single
premium for a given policy, being nothing more than "a life annuity for the premium-
payment period that is equivalent to the net single premium on the particular pol-
icy." HUEBNER & BLACK, supra note 11, at 270 (emphasis in original). The net single
premium for a whole life policy is calculated on the basis of the cost of term insur-
ance for each year the policy is expected to be in force, discounted to the present
value for the year the policy is issued. HUEBNER & BLACK, supra note 11, at 257-58.
Though the whole life insurance net premium is based on the term insurance net
premium, the gross premium for term policies may be adjusted upward by some com-
panies who have experienced higher mortality rates for term insurance policies than
for whole life policies. Beadles, Contracts - Term Insurance, in LIFE AND HEALTH
INSURANCE HANDBOOK 55, 61-62 (D. Gregg & V. Lucas ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as
Beadles]. However, this increase may be offset by the absence of the higher agents'
commissions paid on sales of whole life insurance. See Moffitt, Gaddy's Unconven-
tional Tactics Guide Fast-Growing Life Insurance Concern, Wall St. J., Nov. 20,
1979 at 6, col. 2 (Midwest ed.).
111. HUEBNER & BLACK, supra note 11, at 314-18; H. KRUEGER & L. WAGGONER,
THE LIFE INSURANCE POLICY CONTRACT § 10.1-11.4 (1953); MEYER, supra note 70, at §
3:1.
112. HUEBNER & BLACK, supra note 11, at 254-55; Mehr, supra note 107, at 423.
113. Beadles, supra note 110, at 55, 64; HUEBNER & BLACK, supra note 11, at 5-6;
Mehr, supra note 107, at 423-24.
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icy, the higher cost of insurance coverage in later years is
spread over the entire life of the insured; in a term policy, this
cost is incurred as it accrues, leading to larger premiums in
later years." 4 But these graduated premiums are merely an-
nual rents for an increasingly expensive (or valuable) benefit,
as compared to the mortgage-amortization approach of the
whole life contract purchase.
These differences in equity values and in the flow of cash
premiums have led some writers to justify different estate tax
treatment of identical benefits.11 5 Such writers acknowledge
that premiums for term insurance are purely for the cost of
insurance.11 6 However, those writers describe the premiums
for whole life insurance as building an individual reserve
which is later used to fund a portion of the proceeds.1 This
view' of whole life insurance as a combination of decreasing
term insurance and a savings account (with the sum always
equal to the face of the policy) implies that any proceeds in
excess of the cash value of the policy at death are, in essence,
term insurance proceeds. If term insurance proceeds in fact
cannot be effectively assigned out of an estate unless the as-
signee (or other third party) pays the premiums, this view
would also require inclusion of the "term insurance portion"
of the whole life proceeds in the insured's gross estate under
section 2035,118 a result supported by no case law.
B. Continuity of Contract
The question of effective assignment of a term insurance
policy has often turned on the perception of whether a term
insurance policy is a continuous contract. One view, which was
expressed in Bel,""9 holds that all of the rights under an annu-
ally renewable term policy are created by the last annual pre-
114. Compare note 110 supra with text accompanying notes 112-13 supra.
115. See, e.g., authorities cited at note 104 supra.
116. See, e.g., authorities cited at note 104 supra.
117. See, e.g., authorities cited at note 104 supra. For a discussion of the account-
ing distortions that can result from the use of this approach for valuing policies
owned by a given policyholder, see Falk, Accounting for Cash Value Policies, 1975 J.
RISK & INS. 403.
118. Indeed, this approach has been proposed. See S. SURREY, W. WARREN, P.
McDANIEL & H. GUTMAN, FEDERAL WEALTH TRANSFER TA XATION 269 (1977).
119. Bel v. United States, 452 F.2d 683 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 919
(1972).
1979]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
mium paid. Thus, each annual premium payment constitutes
a new creation and transfer of the policy - necessarily within
three years of death so that the entire policy proceeds will be
includible under section 2035.120
This view would treat group term life insurance as a series
of discrete contracts which, if assignment is to be made at all,
would require annual assignment, thus dooming to failure
under section 2035 any attempt to make a permanent assign-
ment. Such a view ignores the importance of state law in de-
termining the nature of life insurance policy contracts.
Though it is true that the question of how an interest in
property is to be federally taxed is a federal question, the na-
ture of that interest in property is a question of state law.121
Thus, state court pronouncements that guaranteed-renewable
group term life insurance policies are continuous contracts
kept in force by the payment of premiums are relevant to the
question of whether those continuity rights are sufficient to
require their treatment as continous contracts for federal tax
purposes. The courts of several states have treated guaran-
teed-renewable group term policies as continuous contracts. 122
In addition, the Oregon Supreme Court has gone so far as to
hold that a group health insurance policy subject to cancella-
tion at the option of the insurer was nevertheless a continu-
ous contract, apparently because it provided for renewal un-
less the entire group's insurance was cancelled. 123
Similarly, the federal courts have continued to recognize
that state regulation of life insurance affects the nature and
assignability of policies for purposes of federal tax law. 24
State statutes creating rights surviving the nonpayment of
premiums for group term policies 125 cast doubt upon the rea-
120. See id.
121. See Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 78, 80-81 (1940).
122. Don Ray Tool & Die, Inc. v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 381 Mich. 416,
163 N.W.2d 225 (1968); Harwell v. Mutual Ben. Health & Acc. Ass'n, 207 S.C. 150, 35
S.E.2d 160 (1945); Franklin v. Northern Life Ins. Co., 4 Wash. 2d 541, 104 P.2d 310
(1940).
123. Bollenback v. Continental Cas. Co., 243 Or. 498, 414 P.2d 802 (1966).
124. See, e.g., Parson v. United States, 460 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1972); Estate of
Madsen, 1979 T.C.M. 289, P-H Memo T.C. 1 79,289 (1979), appeal taken Nov. 13,
1979, 9th Cir.
125. See HUEBNER & BLACK, supra note 11, at 411-12. See also authorities cited at
note 29 supra.
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sonableness of a blanket assertion that term policies are dis-
crete contracts for purposes of federal taxation.
The classification of term insurance policies as continuous
contracts flows from their various continuity features. Such
policies commonly provide for continuity through a variety of
contractual and (or) statutory features. One is the previously
mentioned right of guaranteed renewability at the option of
the insured without further evidence of insurability and at the
rate for the insured's age at the time of renewal.126 Continuity
is thus based on facts established at the time of the initial
purchase, so logically all rights based on those facts could be
considered to date from that time. By the same token, the
rights of an assignee of a policy arise at the time of assign-
ment and continue therefrom.
A'nother common feature of term policies is the right to
purchase whole life insurance without further evidence of in-
surability.12 The purchase may be in replacement of the term
insurance (commonly called a conversion feature) or in addi-
tion to the term insurance.128 The right of conversion often
persists, either by contract provision or state statute, beyond
the termination of the policy for nonpayment of premium.129
The right also persists in many cases after the insured leaves
the group.130
Assuming that these rights have been validly vested in the
insured's assignee (or other third-party owner), their subse-
quent exercise by the owner should not constitute a new
transfer by the insured. Even the insured's payment of a pre-
mium subsequent to conversion should constitute no more
than a gift of the premium - not a transfer of the previously
assigned proceeds.13 1
126. Beadles, supra note 110, at 57-58; HUEBNER & BLACK, supra note 11, at 407-
08; MEYER, supra note 70, at § 9:1.
127. Beadles, supra note 110, at 58-60; HUEBNER & BLACK, supra note 11, at 406,
409-12; Vogel, Contracts for Special Needs, in LiFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE HAND-
BOOK 92, 95-96 (D. Gregg & V. Lucas ed. 1973).
128. See authorities cited at note 127 supra.
129. HUEBNER & BLACK, supra note 11, at 411-12. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. §§
632.44(2) & 632.57(3)-(5) (1977). Cf. Wis. STAT. § 625.12(2) (1977) (which permits
modification of rates for individual risks if section 632.57(3) is not applidable).
130. HUEBNER & BLACK, supra note 11, at 402-03, 411-12. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. §
632.57(2) (1977).
131. But see text accompanying notes 58-101 supra.
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Where a group of employees constitutes the group covered
by a term insurance policy, the only "right" which may not be
assignable by an insured is the "right" of the employer to pay
the premiums. Since the employer's payment of premiums is
compensation to the employee and the Service has ruled that
the employee makes a constructive gift of the premium to the
assignee, the amount of the premium payment would seem a
reasonable measure of the value of the constructive gift.132
Yet another common feature of term policies is a waiver of
premium clause. In the event of the insured's permanent disa-
bility the policy becomes paid-up insurance for the remainder
of the insured's lifetime without further premium pay-
ments."' 3 Obviously, in such a situation nonpayment of pre-
mium has not resulted in termination of all rights under the
policy.
These rights of continuity in term insurance policies are
obviously valuable. They guarantee more than insurability. In
Wisconsin, for instance, they also prevent an individual in-
sured's health history subsequent to the date of inception of
the term policy from adversely affecting premium levels if the
statutory conversion right is later exercised."3 This protection
can be especially desirable in those common situations where
a group's life insurance carrier is closely affiliated with that
group's medical insurance carrier.
The existence of these rights of continuity in term life in-
surance policies weakens the view that they are merely a se-
ries of separate and discrete annual contracts. The continuity
provisions merely exist in a different format in a term policy
than they do in a whole life policy because of the different
funding techniques previously discussed. If this continuous
contract view is taken, and the continuity rights are recog-
nized as valuable, it may be that gift tax ramifications should
follow from an assignment of those rights. By comparing an
132. See Rev. Rul. 76-490, 1976-2 C.B. 300 (Note that the "economic benefit" lan-
guage applied to each premium payment is broad enough to convey the proceeds
under section 2035 if the policy matures during the period covered.)
133. Beadles, supra note 110, at 61. See, e.g., A.I.C.P.A. Insurance Trust C.P.A.
Plan, on file with the Marquette Law Review.
134. See Wis. STAT. § 632.57(3)(c) (1977). Cf. WIs. STAT. § 625.12(2)(1977) (which,
in the absence of section 632.57(3)(c) would permit modification of rates to reflect
physical condition and other factors affecting individual risk).
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insured's premium rating (based on health and occupation) at
the time of a policy assignment to the insured's premium rat-
ing at the inception of the coverage, it may be possible to
value those continuity rights for gift tax purposes.
On the other hand, the interpolated terminal reserve value
frequently applied to whole life policy transfers for gift tax
purposes1 3 5 is essentially the cash or nonforfeiture value of the
policy, plus a forfeiture charge.136 Whole life policies offer
similar continuity rights. These continuity rights include the
right to exchange the policy for paid-up term insurance or
whole life insurance of a lesser amount upon cessation of pre-
mium payments, as well as the waiver of premium clause. 13 7
These rights generally involve a change in the policy, resulting
in a policy with new terms. While it is true that the exercise
of these rights is funded by the interpolated terminal reserve
value, that is merely a funding mechanism rather than a mea-
sure of the value of these continuity rights.38 If continuity
rights can be ignored in valuing transfers of whole life insur-
ance policies, there is no more reason to consider them in val-
uing term insurance transfers.
C. Public Policy and the Taxation of Term Life Insurance
Proceeds
In addition to the fallacies inherent in trying to distinguish
term insurance proceeds from whole life insurance proceeds
for estate tax purposes, sound public policy dictates equal
treatment. The policy reason is the social desirability that a
family have a means of support in the event of the death of a
member whose labor provides significant financial support.
The likely duration of the need for support is generally
longest when a family is young and the surviving spouse and
children may have little earning capacity compared to their
long term needs. Yet, at the very time when the support obli-
gation is the greatest, the financial ability to provide it is gen-
135. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-6(a), T.D. 6680, 1963-2 C.B. 417, 419. Note that
the regulation implies that outstanding indebtedness may be subtracted from the ter-
minal reserve to arrive at gift tax value, but unearned premiums must be added. Id.
136. The terminal reserve value used in the regulation is a key figure used in de-
termining nonforfeiture values. HUEBNER & BLACK, supra note 11, at 289.
137. See authorities cited at note 111 supra.
138. See notes 108-13, 135-36 and accompanying text supra.
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erally the least: the young family has had little opportunity to
accumulate savings, and a young worker's earning capacity
often is not yet fully developed.
Life insurance is recognized as a primary means of provid-
ing for the cost of support at an affordable price because it is
a risk-distributing funding mechanism." 9 Group term life in-
surance is generally the least costly source for a given amount
of pure insurance protection for the young worker's family.140
To prevent the dissipation of this family protection
through the estate tax before it is available for its intended
social use, group term life insurance should not be put at a tax
disadvantage compared to whole life insurance. The I.R.S. un-
derstood this point well when it administratively initiated the
income tax approach that ultimately became section 79, which
treats group term insurance more advantageously than whole
life insurance.14 ' To further fulfill its social policy role, term
insurance must have essentially the same estate planning flex-
ibility accorded whole life insurance.
On the other hand, because of its increasing cost as the
insured ages, term insurance seems unlikely to contribute to
the increase or preservation of already large estates. Most
deaths occur after retirement age when either conversion to
whole life insurance or continuation of term insurance would
be prohibitively expensive. 142 Premiums after retirement age
are also increased by adverse selection, i.e., that tendency for
persons in good health to discontinue life insurance and those
in poor health to continue it. 143
Accordingly, life insurance - particularly term life insur-
ance - is not likely to be the primary means after retirement
for providing surviving family members with a support fund.
Private retirement plans, Social Security, accumulated savings
or investments, and other programs play a far greater role in
139. See HUEBNER & BLACK, supra note 11, at 2-5, 8-9. See also Beadles, supra
note 110, at 63-64; M. DORFMAN, INTRODUCTION TO INSURANCE 204 (1978).
140. See text accompanying notes 12-13 supra. For a comparison of individual
annually renewable term premium rates to those for whole life policies, see HUEBNER
& BLACK, supra note 11, at 7, graph 1-1.
141. See Salem & Schmalbeck, Group-term Life Insurance: IRS Creates New So-
lutions, Questions and Challenges, 51 J. TAx. 130 (1979).
142. See authorities cited at notes 11 & 13 supra.
143. HUEBNER & BLACK, supra note 11, at 5-6, 402-03.
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funding the generally diminished long term need for survivor-
ship benefits which exists after retirement.' 4
Although a decedent insured under a term insurance pol-
icy is likely to be relatively young and not have a large estate,
inflation may increasingly expose such estates to death taxes,
even as inflation increases the amount of money needed to
support the decedent's dependents. 45 Therefore, tax policy
should not be implemented in a manner which frustrates all
attempts to remove group term life insurance from the reach
of the estate tax.
VI. ESTATE PLANNING WITH GROUP TERM LIFE INSURANCE
The estate planner who advises the removal of the pro-
ceeds of group term life insurance from the client's estate, re-
gardless of whether the policy is to be owned by a natural per-
son or an irrevocable trust,146 is likely to encounter as many
144. But see note 13 supra.
145. See notes 4-8 and accompanying text supra.
146. Though most of the problems in assigning life insurance policies to natural
persons also apply to assignments to trusts, there are significant differences. Life in-
surance transfers in trust present special difficulties, as does designating a trust as
beneficiary. See, e.g., note 23 supra. For a good basic discussion of irrevocable life
insurance trusts, see Keydel, "Irrevocable Life Insurance Trusts: The Current Scene,"
U. Miami 10th Inst. on Est. Plan. 500 (1976). See also Hodges, Tax Planning for
Gifts of Life Insurance, 11 TAx ADVISER 4, 12-16 (1980). Cf. Rev. Rul. 79-47, 1979-6
I.R.B. 19 and Rev. Rul. 76-490, 1976-2 C.B. 300 (availability or nonavailability of the
gift tax annual exclusion for premium payments).
A revocable trust containing an insurance policy on the life of the decedent will
result in inclusion of the proceeds in the decedents gross estate, the applicable sec-
tion depending primarily upon whether the decedent owned and transferred the pol-
icy to the trust. If he did, the policy proceeds will probably be the amount includible
and will be included under section 2038. See Estate of Margrave, 71 T.C. 13 (1978). If
a third party transferred the policy to the revocable trust, that third party becomes
the grantor as to the idlsurance policy and the insured grantor of the revocable trust is
deemed to have a section 2041 general power of appointment unless he lacks the
power to appoint the proceeds to himself, his estate, his creditors, or the creditors of
his estate. Id. See also I.R.C. § 2041. If the revocable trust is unfunded and the trust
grantor pays the premiums, he may be deemed to have replaced the third party as
grantor to the extent that the proceeds are attributable to his premium payments,
making section 2038 applicable to that extent.
An irrevocable trust offers the significant advantage of assuring that the proceeds
will not be included in the gross estate of a policyowner who dies before the insured.
See I.R.C. § 2033. While the includible amount in that situation would appear to be
limited to one year's premium for a term life insurance policy, the amount includible
can become substantial for a whole life policy. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-8(a), T.D.
6680, 1963-2 C.B. 417. Similarly, there is some danger that a third-party owner will
select settlement options which would cause inclusion of substantial amounts in the
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practical as technical problems in implementing the advice.
The practical problems include:
(1) Access to reliable information about policy provisions.
(2) Lack of control over policy provisions by the insured.
(3) Reluctance of a third party administering the policy
(e.g., employer or association) to modify general procedures
to accommodate the advisor's recommendations.
Obtaining a copy of the master policy for group term life
insurance is the first step in determining how to assign an in-
sured's interest. However, the individual insured often has no
more than a certificate indicating coverage under a certain
master contract, and perhaps a booklet explaining the cover-
age. 7 Since statements in the booklet are probably not bind-
ing 48 (a point often emphasized by a disclaimer in the book-
let), the sponsoring employer association must furnish the
master policy. Provisions of the master policy will constitute
the framework for the advisor concerning the appropriate
mechanical steps needed to remove the client-insured's cover-
age from the reach of section 2035. Unless the insured is influ-
ential enough to have the master policy amended to suit his
situation, the framework will be inflexible.
Continuation of the master policy with a particular insurer
is also out of the insured's control. As pointed out in Revenue
Ruling 79-231, the substitution of a new insurer begins the
three-year period anew.' 49 Any suggestion that the insured
employee and the employer contract to maintain a particular
policyowner's gross estate under section 2036, a danger avoided by a well-drafted ir-
revocable trust instrument. See Savage v. United States, 220 F. Supp. 745 (E.D.N.Y.
1963), aff'd, 331 F.2d 678 (2d Cir. 1964); Estate of Pyle, 36 T.C. 1017 (1961), aff'd sub
nom. Estate of Pyle v. Commissioner, 313 F.2d 328 (3d Cir. 1963).
If a natural person is chosen as assignee or third-party owner, that person will
need to avoid potential gift tax problems. If the owner of the policy survives the
insured, the payment of the proceeds to a person other than the policyowner is prob-
ably a constructive gift to that person from the owner. The easiest way to prevent the
problem is to designate the owner as beneficiary and avoid settlement options which
create irrevocable rights in others upon the death of the insured. See Commissioner v.
Chase Manhattan Bank, 259 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 913
(1959). If that has not been done, it may still be possible to effect a last-minute solu-
tion to the gift tax problem through the use of state statutes giving an assignee rights
superior to those of the beneficiary. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. § 632.47(2)(1977).
147. See MEYER, supra note 70, at §§ 20:2, :5.
148. Id.
149. Rev. Rul. 79-231, 1979-31 I.R.B. 9.
[Vol. 63:275
GROUP TERM INSURANCE
master policy is probably impractical. Employers or associa-
tions will be reluctant to surrender the right to terminate or
change insurers because of the premium increases that are
commonly permissible on each anniversary. 150 Economic un-
certainty may also make employers reluctant to lock them-
selves into a five-year contract despite the estate tax advan-
tages of five-year term insurance over annually renewable
term life insurance.151 Nor does contracting address the con-
trol problems associated with employees who change employ-
ment or memberships and thus leave one group and join an-
other. The estate planner should advise the client-insured (or
any third party policyowner) whether to convert the group
term coverage to whole life individual coverage or to let that
particular coverage lapse. Obviously this is feasible only if the
client is aware that employment changes result in a need to
review the insurance coverage. Thus, a particular group term
insurance problem may not stay solved indefinitely. Consider-
ing the possibilities of change in the insured's marital status
or the death of the assignee before the insured, a possibility of
reverter may be desirable if the third-party owner is a natural
person.152
150. See HUEBNER & BLACK, supra note 11, at 409.
151. See text accompanying notes 99-101 supra.
152. See Rev. Rul. 79-117, 1979-15 I.R.B. 12 (containing an adaptable beneficiary
designation approach); Rev. Rul. 76-421, 1976-2 C.B. 280.
Because Revenue Ruling 79-117 indicates that the value of the insured's right to
designate disposition of the proceeds of the assigned policy by will (if he survives the
policyowner) would be less than 5% of the value of the insurance proceeds ultimately
paid, any retained rights would not be taxed under section 2037 or section 2042. But
cf. Sherman v. United States, 79-1 U.S.T.C. T 13288 (E.D. Va. 1979) (Court found
proceeds of a life insurance policy includible under section 2037 without even discuss-
ing the value of the reversionary interest or the 5% test of the statute). If the possi-
bility of reverter is created before the assignment, the fact that the nature of the
right is within the scope of section 2037 should protect the proceeds from taxation
under section 2041 (as a general power of appointment created and held by the as-
signee), though it is probably safer to use limiting language which would take the
power clearly outside the scope of section 2041. See I.R.C. § 2041 and Treas. Reg. §
20.2041-1(b)(2), T.D. 6296, 1958-2 C.B. 432, 521. Though the reserved right would
probably be includible in the insured's gross estate under section 2033, the less than
5% value established by the Service seems a small price for the flexibility gained.
If the policyowner does in fact predecease the insured, it would appear that the
insured then has incidents of ownership of sufficient value to require inclusion of the
proceeds in his gross estate under section 2042. However, so long as the beneficiary
designation which creates his power is itself revocable, the person who receives own-
ership of the policy by inheritance or the terms of the original assignee's will would
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Another means of keeping group insurance proceeds out of
an insured's estate may not be feasible in many situations.
Having a third party make the initial purchase and pay pre-
miums from separate funds avoids the question of transfer
under section 2035.15' However, the economies sought in
group coverage require uniformity, so the insured often must
be the applicant and original owner. (Otherwise the insurer in
Wisconsin, for example, has the burden of ascertaining
whether the third-party purchaser has an insurable inter-
est.)154 On the other hand, if the Bel concept is followed (that
each premium creates a new and discrete policy), a third-
party assignee who paid the last premium would apparently
be deemed to have purchased the policy ab initio, i.e., without
assignment from the insured, at least for purposes of section
2035.155 Yet, even third-party payment may be difficult to ar-
range if the employer is paying part or all of the premiums. 156
have the ability to completely remove the insured's incidents of ownership before the
insured's death. Obviously, if the insured becomes the policyowner again, any subse-
quent assignment he might make would cause inclusion of the proceeds in the in-
sured's gross estate if he fails to survive for three years after the assignment.
If the insured did not create the reversionary right before assignment and it is
instead created by the assignee as in Revenue Ruling 79-117, the beneficiary designa-
tion creating it should limit the class of persons the insured is permitted to designate
by will so that he cannot designate himself, his estate, or the creditors of either as
recipients of the proceeds. Otherwise, even though the insured dies before the as-
signee and the assignee actually receives the proceeds, there may be a question of
whether there was property to which a general power of appointment could attach for
purposes of inclusion of the proceeds in his gross estate under section 2041. See Es-
tate of Margrave, 71 T.C. 13 (1978).
153. But see text accompanying notes 162-63 infra. Ownership by the employer
may solve the section 2035 problem, but care must be taken to avoid incidents of
ownership problems under section 2042. See note 23 supra. The employer may also
lose his income tax deduction for premium payments. See I.R.C. §§ 162 and 264(a);
see also Treas. Reg. §§ 1.162-7(b)(1), T.D. 6291, 1958-1 C.B. 63, 70 and 1.264-1, T.D.
6228, 1957-1 C.B. 109, 110.
154. WIs. STAT. § 631.07 (1977). Traditionally the lack of insurable interest gave
the insurer a defense against payment. Salzman, Insurable Interest in Life Insur-
ance, 1965 INs. L.J. 517. Wisconsin statute section 631.07(4)(1977) removes that
defense.
155. See Bel v. United States, 452 F.2d 683 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S.
919 (1972).
156. It may be possible to shelter part of the proceeds in a contributory plan if
the assignee pays the employee's share of the premiums. See Estate of Silverman v.
Commissioner, 521 F.2d 574 (2d Cir. 1975) (but note that the court expressed doubt
about affirming a pro rate approach and indicated that perhaps only the actual pre-
miums paid by the assignee should be deductible for the purpose of estate taxation
under section 2035).
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One must also recognize that the increasing cost of term life
insurance may become quite a burden on the third-party own-
er before the insured retires or leaves the group.
In a few instances where whole life insurance is coupled
with term insurance, it might be feasible to assign the policy
to a qualified pension or profit-sharing plan.' 5 As the pro-
ceeds would become part of the qualified plan distribution,
they could be excluded from estate taxation. Even a lump
sum distribution is exempt from estate tax if the recipient
does not elect "ten-year averaging" for income tax pur-
poses.158 However, if the income tax and estate tax burdens
fall on different beneficiaries, the failure to so elect may be
too high a price to pay. The terms of the plan itself will also
affect the feasibility of such a transfer. Since the amount of
life insurance includible in qualified plans is limited 15 and
taxation is complex, the estate planner must also analyze the
income taxation of subsequent premium payments and retire-
ment benefits,160 as well as the payment of proceeds to a par-
ticular beneficiary.
Given the apparent nominal value of a term life insurance
policy, a bona fide sale might accomplish an assignment quali-
fying for exclusion under section 2035(b)(1). But this has the
potential of subjecting the proceeds to income tax in the
hands of some transferee-beneficiary.161 It would be feasible
only if the tax brackets of the parties have, and will continue
to have, a sufficient spread (assignor's estate tax bracket, as-
157. For a discussion of the requirements for such a transfer, see Simmons, "Life
Insurance Transfers After the Tax Reform Act," U. Miami 12th Inst. on Est. Plan.
1502-07 (1978).
158. I.R.C. § 2039(c) & (f) (note that section 2039(c) states "notwithstanding the
provisions of this section or of any provision of law," so it would appear to control
over section 2035).
159. Life insurance in qualified plans must be merely "incidental" to the plan.
Treas. Reg. 1.401-1(b)(1)(i) & (ii), T.D. 6722, 1964-1 C.B. 144, 150 and T.D. 6203,
1956-2 C.B. 219, 224. See also Rev. Rul. 74-307, 1974-2 C.B. 126; Rev. Rul. 74-325,
1974-2 C.B. 127 (definitions of incidental).
160. See I.R.C. § 72(m)(3), 101(b), & 402(a). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.72-16, T.D.
-6676, 1963-2 C.B. 41, 47; § 1.101-2, T.D. 7428, 1976-2 C.B. 160; § 1.101-3, T.D. 6577,
1961-2 C.B. 17; and § 1.402(a)-l(a), T.D. 6885, 1966-2 C.B." 307, 340.
161. See I.R.C. § 101(a) and Treas. Reg. § 1.101-1, T.D. 6783, 1965-1 C.B. 180,
181. A transfer for value would also seem more likely to require that the assignee
have an insurable interest in the life of the insured than would a gratuitous transfer.
See HUESBNER & BLACK, supra note 11, at 123.
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signee's income tax bracket), and it obviously has all of the
other practical problems of group policy transfers discussed
above.
Payment of premium problems may become even more
complicated to analyze where the assignee or other owner of
the group policy is the spouse of the insured and the policy is
community property. Care must be taken in assigning the
community property interest of the insured,"6 2 and the owner
would need separate funds to pay premiums in order to get
the premiums out of the estate. Even in common-law states,
caution dictates that premiums not be paid out of accounts
held jointly with the insured. Also, the insured should not
make gifts of cash to the owner of the policy in the amounts
of the premiums and at the times premiums are due. Such
gifts would seem to imply an understanding that the funds
would be used to pay the premiums - thus destroying the
separate funds argument. 16
3
In spite of all of the practical and technical problems of
removing group term life insurance from an estate, any rea-
sonable attempt may be worthwhile. If the assignment fails to
remove the proceeds from the scope of post-1978 section 2035,
special circumstances may make it possible to convince the
I.R.S. that the proceeds are not taxable because the pre-1977
contemplation of death version of section 2035 is applicable
and the presumption is rebutted6 or that the requirement of
valuation at the time of death reduces the includible value
sharply.6 5 If the proceeds are indeed includible in the gross
162. See note 79 supra. There may also be a question of whether the funds used
for premium payments were community funds or separate property. See, e.g., Daly v.
United States, 35 A.F.T.R.2d 75-1659 (D. Idaho 1975).
163. See First Nat'l Bank of Oregon v. United States, 488 F.2d 575 (9th Cir.
1973); Detroit Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 467 F.2d 964 (6th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 410 U.S. 929 (1973). See also Barall, "Use of Life Insurance in Estate Plan-
ning - Recent Developments," 31 N.Y.U. Inst. on Fed. Tax. 1053, 1089 (1973); Sim-
mons, "Life Insurance Transfers After the Tax Reform Act," U. Miami 12th Inst. on
Est. Plan. 1 1500, 1501.2 (1978).
164. See Rev. Rul. 79-212, 1979-28 I.R.B. 35 (for assignments made before 1977).
This would seem to apply only to deaths before 1980, but it could be argued, perhaps,
that the date of purchase or initial assignment should be given effect where there was
no possibility of the policyowner's assumption of premium payments after the Tax
Reform Act of 1976 removed a relied-upon belief that the presumption could be re-
butted. See authorities cited at note 64 supra.
165. See American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 594 F.2d 1141 (7th
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estate, the premiums paid within three years of death can
probably 6 be excluded.
Caution is indicated if either the assignment of the policy
itself or the premiums to be paid by the insured, together
with other gifts to the same donee during the taxable year,
will exceed $3,000, requiring the filing of a gift tax return.
This in itself would bring the premium payments by the in-
sured decedent into the gross estate even if the proceeds are
excludible.'67
In addition, any post-1976 gift made within three years of
death must be "grossed up" for estate tax purposes by the
amount of any gift tax paid on the transfer.168 Though the
estate receives a credit for the amount of gift tax paid on a
gift includible under section 2035, the "gross-up" provision
makes that gift part of the taxable base and the net result is
an increase in the total tax.""9 Thus, the tax cost of either of
the situations in the preceding paragraph will be increased if
gift tax must be paid at the time of transfer,170 either because
the unified credit has already been consumed'' or because
the gift tax marital deduction is not available for the gift.' 2
While such an assignment may be highly desirable for a rea-
sonably young and healthy client, it is essential that the client
understand that the transfer exposes his estate to increased
taxes if he should die within the three year period.
If no gift tax has been paid, the failure of the assignment
or purchase to shield the proceeds of the policy from inclusion
under section 2035 will leave the estate in no worse position
than it would have been in if the decedent had owned the pol-
Cir. 1979) (policies where insurer contests liability for payment).
166. Peters v. United States, 572 F.2d 851 (Ct. Cl. 1978). But note that the 1978
Act creates ambiguities as to premium amounts of $3,000 and under. See text accom-
panying notes 61-64 supra. It is true that the language of Peters indicates a flat pro-
hibition of the inclusion of both proceeds and premiums. However, it may be argued
in an annually renewable term policy situation that application of the Bel rationale
would permit inclusion of prior premiums because only the last premium ripens into
proceeds.
167. See I.R.C. § 2035(b)(2) and text accompanying notes 61-64 supra.
168. I.R.C. § 2035(c).
169. See I.R.C. §9 2035(a) & (c), 2012(a) & (b) and 2001(b) & (c).
170. See I.R.C. 99 2501 & 2503.
171. See I.R.C. 9 2505.
172. See I.R.C. § 2523.
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icy and paid the premiums. 173 If any gifts of premiums were
not required to be included in a gift tax return and the at-
tempt to avoid the operation of section 2035 succeeds, 174 both
the proceeds and any premiums paid by the insured decedent
or his employer will escape inclusion in the decedent's gross
estate. Though it is true that the policyowner's failure to sur-
vive the insured, in situations where an irrevocable trust is
not chosen as the third-party policyowner, would result in the
policy's inclusion in the policyowner's gross estate, the
amount so includible for a term insurance policy would ap-
pear to be limited to the last premium paid 17 and seems gen-
erally a small risk compared to the potential benefit of remov-
ing the proceeds from the insured's gross estate.
BEVERLY J. BOYER
173. See Peters v. United States, 572 F.2d 851 (Ct. C1. 1978). But see note 166
supra.
174. This assumes that the courts adopt the position of the congressional commit-
tees that premiums not includible in a gift tax return (or transferring policy proceeds
under pre-1976 law) are not includible in the gross estate under section 2035. As dis-
cussed in note 146 supra, it also assumes that the planner has avoided situations that
may cause inclusion under sections 2036-2042. See also notes 23 & 79 and text ac-
companying note 158 supra.
175. See I.R.C. § 2033; Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-8(a), T.D. 6680, 1963-2 C.B. 417.
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